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apply to a charge such as that against the petitioner, who was
sentenced to two years imprisonment ....

7

While these cases have indicated the general interpretation that courts
are beginning to give the Gideon case, they have given no indication
of how extended the indigent accused's right to counsel will become
in the future.
At the present time, Wisconsin law requires appointment of counsel
only when the accused indigent has been charged with a felony., Clearly,
section 957.26 has been shown to be inadequate in light of the Gideon
and the Melvin decisions. The Wisconsin legislature must now determine where to draw the line regarding the requirement that counsel be
appointed for the indigent defendant. The Banmiller and the Otten
cases have indicated that Gideon can be applied to all criminal prosecutions; whereas, the Melvin case required a substantial penalty before
Gideon could be invoked. It is this writer's opinion that counsel should
be appointed in cases where the indigent could be sentenced to a prison
term of one year or more.
FRANCIS J. PODVIN
Evidence: The Admissibility of Hospital Records Under Section
327.25 of the Wisconsin Statutes-The recent case of Rupp v. Travelers Indernnty Co.' pointed out a basic problem troubling many practicing attorneys in regard to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
This case involved an action for the recovery of damages for personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile accident. The issue
on appeal was whether the trial court erred in not admitting into evidence hospital records and records of an orthopedist, who had treated
the plaintiff after the custodian of the records identified them as entries made in the usual course of business. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the trial court was correct in not admitting these records as regular entries under section 327.25.2
The plaintiff in the Rupp3 case failed to call to the stand any doctor,
nurse, intern, or employee of the hospital, who had made the various
entries, or to offer to show that such persons were beyond the jurisdiction of the court, dead, or insane as required by section 327.25. Admissibility was denied on the ground that a proper foundation for such
evidence had not been laid. The court held that it was error to admit
these records without first laying a foundation by calling as witnesses
those who made said entries or without first showing that the entrants
were beyond the jurisdiction of the court, dead, or insane. The trial
7

Otten v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 216 F. Supp. 289 (D.Md. 1963).

8 Wis. STAT. §957.26 (1961).
1 Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 17 Wis. 2d 16, 115 N.W. 2d 612 (1962).
2 Wis. STAT. §327.25 (1961).

3 Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra note 1.
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court relied on Bielke v. Knaack4 in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held:
The contention that the court erred to the prejudice of the defendants in admitting over their objection certain daily hospital
records relating to the condition of the plaintiff and the treatment
given to him as a patient, which constituted the history of the
plaintiff's case while receiving treatment in the hospital, presents
a more serious question. The sisters who nursed the plaintiff and
who, in large part, kept the daily records were not produced
upon the trial nor was it shown that they were beyond the jurisdiction or insane as provided by sec. 327.25, Stats.... We think
that the admission of these records was error ...5 (Emphasis

added.)
The plaintiff in the Rupp case alleged at the trial that there was a
practical necessity for the court to allow admission of the records without the testimony of each person who had made any entry therein, as
there were some seventy-five persons who had made such entries. The
supreme court recognized plaintiff's argument and questioned the logic
of the Bielke case by stating:
It would be an impossible task, and, if not, an impractical one,
both from the standpoint of hospital administration and of the
administration of justice under our trial procedure, to call as
witnesses so large a number of persons, many of whom, no
doubt, would be unable to recall any independent recollection
of his particular entry other than it was in his handwriting and
was true. 6
But the supreme court noted that it could neither construe nor modify
section 327.25 on appeal, but could only act in compliance with section
251.18.7 This section in substance provides that a pleading, practice, or

procedure statute may only be modified by a court rule after the court
has held a public hearing and published the required notice. The court
did, however, refer this problem to the Judicial Council of Wisconsin8
for study and a report on the merits of a proposed change in section
327.25.
The problem in securing the admission of a party's account book
and regular entry records into evidence was considered in an article
in Wisconsin Continuing Legal EducationP by Reserve Circuit Judge
Francis X. Swietlik. It was there pointed out that the original reasons
for the existence of the "Account Book Rule"'1 have ceased to exist,
4Bielke v. Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932).
5Id.at 495,242 N.W. at 178, 179.
6Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra note 1, at 22, 115 N.W. 2d at 616.
7 WIs. STAT. §251.18 (1961).
8
For the creation and membership of the 16 member council, see: Wis. STAT.
§251.181 (1961).
9 Swietlik, Hearsay Rule in Wisconsn-Part 3, Wis. Continuing Legal Ed.,
No.2,p.1 (1962).
0 Vol. II,

1 WIS.STAT. §327.24 (1961).
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since parties to a lawsuit or those having an interest therein are now
competent to testify. 1 Therefore, all entries regularly made, whether
they be in the party's own account book, or in the account books of third
parties, or in any other form of a book, become, in fact, "Regular Entries."' 2 It was Swietlik's contention that section 327.24 should be repealed and that section 327.25 should be reworded to conform more
closely with provisions of modern legislation.
In a scholarly article written by Norman C. Skogstad and Howard
H. Koppa, 13 the history of the business entry rule is traced from 17th
Century common law to the present. It is basically an exception to the
hearsay rule, and has been codified in many states as well as by Congress. Wisconsin has two such statutes dating back to 1839,14 the scope
of which through the years have been greatly enlarged by the legislature and judicial interpretation. The federal "Shop Book Rule"'15 is
probably the broadest of all such legislation, and as a practical matter,
it admits as a record or writing contemplated by the statute any systematically kept record if it is the product of a routine procedure.
The supreme court's referral to the Judicial Council", resulted in a
report followed by the court's adoption of a rule effective July 15, 1963
(pursuant to section 251.18) which reads as follows:
Section 327.24, Wisconsin Statutes, is hereby repealed.
Section 327.25 is hereby repealed and re-created to read as
follows:
Entries in the Usual Course of Business: Medical
Records, (1) any writing or record, whether in the form
of an entry in a book or otherwise made as a memorandum
or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, is
admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction,
occurrence or event, if the trial judge finds that it was
made in the regular course of any business, and that it was
the regular course of such business to make such memor"See Wis. STAT. §325.13 (1961).
12 As regular entries they are admissible under Wis. STAT. §327.25 (1961).
13 Skogstad and Koppa, Admissibility of Business Entries,1958 Wis. L. REV. 245.
14 Wis. TERR. STAT. §§77-80 (1839).
1562 Stat. 945 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1732 (a) (1958), which reads as follows:
"(a) Record Made in Regular Course of Business. In any court of the
United States and in any court established by Act of Congress, any writing
or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made
as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event
shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event,
if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course
of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such
act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.
"All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to
affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.
"The term 'business,' as used in this section, includes business, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind."
26 See preceding discussion in text supra of the action taken by the court in
the Rupp case.
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andum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.
All other circumstances of the making of such writing or
record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker may be shown to affect its weight, but
they shall not affect its admissibility. The term "business"
includes businesses, professions, occupations and callings
of every kind.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to entries made in medical or
hospital records if entries relate to treatment given or
examination conducted within this state. No such entry or
portion thereof which constitutes a medical opinion or diagnosis may be admitted in evidence under this subsection
except by stipulation of the parties or except when offered against the interest of a party by whom or under
whose 7 supervision such entry or portion thereof was
made.'
This statute liberalized the rule as to the admissibility of business
records. Subsection (1) no longer required the appearance and testimony of all those who made entries therein, and its wording was almost
identical to the federal "Shop Book Rule.""'
Subsection (2) of section 327.25, as adopted by the supreme court,
was intended to limit specifically the content of hospital records which
were made admissible under subsection (1). In the Judicial Council
study, the two major proposals for revision 9 both sought to exclude
medical opinions and diagnoses and also to exclude record of treatment
and examination received out-of-state which were included in these
hospital records. By excluding medical opinions or diagnoses contained
in the hospital records, subsection (2) did not allow the plaintiff to
prove by the record such material facts as the cause of the injury, the
nature and extent of the patient's pain and suffering, and the probable
extent of any temporary or permanent disability. In other words, the
plaintiff would not be allowed to establish a prima facie case simply
by the admission of the hospital record, without calling the physician
as a witness and allowing the opposing party to cross-examine him as
to his opinions and diagnoses. Subsection (2) also excluded any portion
of a hospital record which related to treatment given or examination
conducted by a physician outside of the state. There would be, it was
felt, too great a risk of fraud involved in allowing the admission of
such entries contained in the hospital record. The basis for this feeling
was that a physician rendering treatment or conducting an examination
§327.25 (1961), as re-created by Supreme Court Rule at 20 Wis.
2d XXV (effective July 15. 1963), as recommended by the Judicial Council.
1862 STAT. 945 (1948), 28 U.S.C.§1732 (a) (1958).
19 See Judicial Council Minutes, November 16, 1962, wherein Atty. Gerald T.
Hayes of Milwaukee proposed subsection (2) to §327.25. See also, Judicial
Counsel Minutes, February 22, 1963, wherein Atty. Theron Pray of Ashland
proposed creation of a new statute §327.251 instead of subsection (2) to
§32725.
'17WIs. STAT.
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outside of the state could not be easily reached by subpoena to testify
to the inaccuracy of such entries so as to rebut the evidence submitted
by the plaintiff.
Whether or not the question is one of exclusive judicial competency, 20 the supreme court's rule does not in fact preclude the state legislature from acting on the same matter. Section 251.18 provides that the
supreme court's action does not "abridge the right of the legislature
to enact, modify, or repeal statutes or rules relating to pleading, practice, or procedure,"' 2 1 and pursuant to this section, the legislature re-

pealed and re-created section 327.25 to read as follows:
Business Records as Evidence. Any writing or record, whether
in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a
memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to its identity and mode of preparation, and if
made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record
22
at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event (sic)

within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of
the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect
its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility. The term "business," as used in this section, includes
busi23
ness, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.
This statute in effect purports to repeal the court's rule amending section 327.25.
It is important to note, especially, the deletion of subsection (2) of
the court's rule in the legislative enactment. This is the most startling
difference between the two statutes. Where the court apparently intended a moderately-liberal rule, the legislature on the other hand chose
an ultra-liberalrule. The legislative statute permits the introduction of
all entries contained in the hospital record including opinions, diagnoses,
and prognostications of the attending physician without the necessity
of calling the entrants, including the physician, even though they are
available at the time of the trial. This allows the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case merely by the introduction of a hospital record and
to thereby meet his burden of proof without calling the physician so
See In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18 Wisconsin Statutes, 204 Wis.
501, 510, 236 N.W. 717, 720 (1931), wherein the court stated: "It is concluded
that the power to regulate procedure, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, was considered to be essentially a judicial power, or at least not a
strictly legislative power, and that there is no constitutional objection to the
delegation of it to the courts by the legislature." This case clearly presents
the constitutional questions involved with Wis. STAT. §251.18 (1961).
21 Wis. STAT. §251.18 (1961).
22The addition of or is necessary to correct an obvious typographical error.
23 Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 256.
20
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that he may be available for cross-examination by the opposing party.
Due to the deletion of subsection (2) of the supreme court's rule, the
statute also allows admission of evidence contained in the hospital record involving examination or treatment outside the state. Apparently
the legislature chose to disregard the possibility of fraud where outof-state witnesses could not, without out-of-state depositions, be
reached by subpoena. Once the plaintiff has introduced a hospital record containing an entry of examination or treatment outside the state,
the opposing party has no possibility of disproving the accuracy of such
entry (because of his inability to reach any of the out-of-state entrants
by subpoena), unless he has prior notice that the plaintiff intends to
rely entirely on the hospital record or unless he can secure a continuance so that he may be able to take depositions from out-of-state entrants.
In conclusion, it is no longer necessary under section 327.25 to call
all the entrants who made entries in a hospital record as required by
the Rupp 24 case. But, assuming its essential validity, 25 the present legislative enactment opens the door to fraud and also allows the plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case without the necessity of calling the attending physician whose opinions and diagnoses are contained in the
hospital record. This leaves the opposing party without opportunity to
cross-examine the physician. It is the opinion of this author that subsection (2) of the supreme court's rule should be added to the legislative statute in order to alleviate these problems.
DENIS J. WAGNER

24
25

Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra note 1.
See note 20 supra.
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